Introduction
The 1948 Costa Rican civil war stands as the most significant breakdown of emerging democratic practices in what many believe is a country with a democratic destiny.1 No other political conflict has so polarised the country and cost so many lives. Nor has any other civil war so influenced the way analysts view and understand the development of democratic institutions in Costa Rica. Why political actors in Costa Rica settled their disputes on the battlefield, however, is a question that has yet to generate a satisfactory response.
The immediate precedent of the civil war was the annulment of the presidential election by the Constitutional Congress on I March 1948. The election, allegedly won by the opposition candidate Otilio Ulate Blanco and his Party of National Unification (PUN), occurred in an environment of intense party competition, not infrequently characterised by the use of violence and fraud. These results were questioned by members of the governing political party (the National Republican Party [PRN] ) loyal to the government's favourite and former president of the Republic between 1940 and 1944, Dr Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia.
* The initial (and major) drafts of this article were written while I was a Visiting Professor, School of History and Research Associate, Centre for Historical Investigations, University of Costa Rica. I wish to acknowledge the support of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies for an International Doctoral Research Fellowship that funded the research upon which this paper is based.
1 For an evaluation of alternative explanations of the democratisation of Costa Rican politics, see my 'Explicando los origenes de los regimenes democraticos: Costa Rica en perspectiva te6rica', Anuario de Estudios Centroamericanos (San Jose, Costa Rica), Vol.
16, Fasc. I (1990).
Fabrice Lehoucq is a Graduate Instructor of Political Science at Duke University. In the weeks that followed, attempts to negotiate a pact between the opposition and government proved fruitless. Attempts to effect such political compromises became pointless once the forces led by Jose Figueres Ferrer made clear to other political actors their intention to organise a junta to rule Costa Rica for what eventually became a period of eighteen months.2 During its brief rule, the junta convened a National Constituent Assembly that refashioned Costa Rican political institutions by, among other things, creating a politically autonomous electoral court system and enfranchising all Costa Ricans over the age of 20.3
Images of these events diverge among Costa Ricans.4 Many see 1948 as the culmination of the Calderonistas' attempts to install a corrupt dictatorship in Costa Rica.5 The PRN is also lambasted for commencing an alliance with the Popular Vanguard Party, PVP (the Costa Rican communist party), during Calderon Guardia's presidency, an alliance solidified by his successor, Teodoro Picado. In these accounts, Figueres is portrayed as the saviour of Costa Rica's democratic heritage. Indeed, the most recent attempts to discuss Costa Rican democracy credit Figueres with not only vanquishing the 'Caldero-comunista' regime, but with making the key decisions leading to the consolidation of the politically stable democratic regime present in Costa Rica since 1949. 6 It was in this year, after all, that the Figueres junta relinquished power to President-elect Ulate Blanco, the first individual to exercise the powers of the presidency under the new constitution.
Few other voices echo as loudly as those of the Figueristas. Though several prominent individuals of the old regime have left memoirs or written about diverse aspects of these years, their accounts either have not been made readily available or not received the attention they merit as alternative interpretations of the events surrounding the 1948 civil war.7
Common to the most prevalent images of the 1948 civil war is the belief that the conflict between a social reformist (but, many would add, a corrupt) government and an allegedly conservative opposition closely aligned with Costa Rica's coffee oligarchy could be settled only through the force of arms. Jorge Mario Salazar Mora neatly summarises this widely accepted belief when he writes that: the 1 9 48 election could not resolve peacefully the dispute between the two political groupings of that epoch, because the degree of social tension between class fractions and classes exceeded the limits of peaceful coexistence.
Consequently a trial of strength was required to restructure the state apparatus and re-accommodate social forces. 8 In this essay I will probe the veracity of this belief.
For many, raising this issue is pointless because it leads to counterfactual reasoning of dubious utility. Yet I suggest that not pursuing this line of inquiry implies the more troublesome assumption that the civil war was inevitable. To the extent that the volition of individuals is discussed, the proponents of the strong inevitabilist thesis see individuals and other political agents as actors caught in a play that, by definition, possesses pre established roles. Though perhaps none of the chroniclers of the 1940S quite so openly adopts the strong inevitabilist thesis favoured by Salazar Mora, they all share a number of its essential corollaries, as I shall show in this article.
What is pernicious about the inevitabilist thesis, I argue, is that it leads to the under-reporting of evidence and/or the refusal to explore issues that do not fit with whatever version of this thesis the analyst is either covertly or overtly propounding. Assuming that the 1948 civil war was inevitable helps to obscure the role played by different political actors; sustains distorted images of the nature and significance of the 1948 civil war; and cripples the study of the origins of democratic institutions in Costa Rica. That both those who focus on the behaviour of politicians and those who seek to uncover the 'real ' economic roots of the 1948 civil war are inevitabilists suggests that the study of this conflict may benefit from critical reflection.
The principal objective of this essay is to suggest that compelling reasons exist for re-interpreting the origins and significance of the 1948 civil war. It begins by discussing the most important, largely political accounts of the 1948 civil war. It then examines the arguments made by what are here labelled class and economic interpretations of the 1940S. It then argues that extant ways of understanding the origins of the 1948 civil war are undermined by the existence of questionable empirical claims and dubious theoretical conclusions. The conclusion sketches an alternative way of conceptualising political conflict that unravels the puzzles left unresolved by the principal analysts of the 1948 civil war.
Political perspectives
The two most important political chronicles of the events leading to the 1948 civil war are the books by Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli and John Patrick Bel1.9 Although Miguel Acuna, Eugenio Rodriguez Vega and Jacobo Schifter (in one of his books not examined in this article) have written on the politics of this period, I do not classify their volumes along with those of Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell, because the former three authors pursue different objectives.10 Acuna is more interested in questioning certain beliefs about the events of 1948, largely through the use of interviews with key individuals and a reading of select documents. Rodriguez Vega's book is essentially a well-written set of personal recollections about the 1940s, In broad outline, Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell offer similar accounts of the relations between the government and opposition during the 1940s. The differences between their books are minor and stem from the fact that Bell, as a Tulane University graduate student conducting research for his PhD dissertation, provides a more analytical account of the 1940S than Aguilar Bulgarelli. The narratives of these two authors attempt to uncover the multiplicity of factors that influenced the behaviour of key political figures and political parties during this decade. Through a description of such events and processes, Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell seek to explain why the conflict between government and opposition led to the outbreak of armed hostilities in 1948.
Both Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell trace the origins of the deep rift between the opposition and the governments of Calderon Guardia and Picado to the early years of the Calderon presidency. In a series of events that remain unclear and understudied, Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell suggest that Calderon Guardia's declaration of war on Germany, Italy and Japan during the last weeks of 1941 alienated key members of Costa Rica's dominant class, many of whom were purportedly German and Italian immigrants or their descendants and/or sympathisers of the Axis powers. These individuals, along with the former president between 1936 and 1940, Leon Cortes Castro, and his followers began to organise a new political party, the Democratic Party (PD) in opposition to Calderon Guardia's government. Allegedly most of Costa Rica's wealthy, led by Cortes Castro, became entrenched opponents of the government once Calderon Guardia began a series of reforms that gave birth to the Costa Rican Social Security System (1941), the country's first Labour Code (1943) By 1945, violence and other forms of protest became widespread once elements within the opposition began to believe that the government would never permit official candidates to lose elections. In 1942, the first occasion in which the opposition attempted to participate in electoral politics, its efforts were stymied by officially sponsored or permitted electoral fraud (a resource frequently employed by Costa Rican governments to influence electoral results). The use of such fraud was repeated in the 1944 presidential and legislative elections that were marred by irregularities that, in the opposition's view, were of sufficient extent to suggest that fraud had prevented Cortes Castro from rightfully becoming Costa Rica's next president. Unfortunately, neither author attempts to organise systematically the many and varied reports of fraud existing in de una politica de alianzas (San Jose, 1988) . For additional discussions of Sanabria's role in the promulgation of these " and related reforms, see Santiago Arrieta, EI pensamiento socio-politico de Monseiior Sanabria (San Jose, 1977) , Ricardo Blanco Segura, Monseiior Sanabria (San Jose, 1971) and Gustavo Adolfo Soto Valverde, La ig lesia costarricense y la cuestion social: antecedentes, andlisis y proyecciones de la reforma social Costarricense de 1940-4} (San Jose, 1985) . Soto Valverde's book is particularly useful because it challenges the received opinion that Calderon Gu ardia needed to befriend the communists in order to avoid being overthrown by groups of angry capitalists. See especially pp. 189-347. This issue will be discussed in the next section of this article. Costa Rican newspapers, or to examine other primary source material, to ascertain the veracity of opposition claims so that, at the very least, a more complete account of the nature, magnitude and distribution of electoral fraud could be established. For these authors, the opposition's lack of faith in the government's willingness to hold fair elections became a key issue during the huelga de bra z os caMos of late July 1947. This strike succeeded in paralysing a portion of the nation's commerce, and only came to an end when President Pica do signed a public agreement emphasising his commitment to holding non fraudulent elections in 1948. Bell, in particular, also discusses the opposition's well-organised publicity campaign aimed at discrediting the government by repeating charges of fiscal and electoral corruption and by playing on the anti-communism of Costa Rican society and the US Embassy (ever more receptive to such efforts with the onset of the cold war).15 Finally, Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell spend some time outlining government attempts to reorganise the electoral registry and to revamp electoral practices as required by the recently enacted 1946 Electoral Code, despite the increasingly apparent lack of time to do so.
Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell devote many pages to describing the most salient events leading to the start of the civil war, once preliminary electoral results revealed that the opposition candidate, Ulate Blanco (54,931 votes), had defeated the government's favourite, Calderon Guardia (44,438 votes) . They show how efforts by the National Electoral Tribunal (TNE) to tally the vote, and to issue a provisional verdict on the elections by 25 February, were hampered by the partial destruction of already deficient and incomplete electoral material in a mysterious fire. Both authors also point out that when Calderonistas, believing that large numbers of their voters were prevented from casting ballots, presented the TNE with a petition requesting that these elections be nullified, their claims were ridiculed by the opposition and met with indifference by the presiding members of the TNE. In the eyes of both Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell, these events only confirmed the belief of each side in the untrustworthiness of the other, thus polarising the Costa Rican party system.
Consequently neither Aguilar Bulgarelli nor Bell expresses surprise that on 1 March (the constitutionally designated date requiring Congress to issue the final verdict on the presidential race in an election year) the Calderonista-dominated Congress nullified the election. Despite efforts by Monsefior Sanabria and others to mediate a solution between the government and opposition, the civil war is said to have begun on 12 Despite their unstated premise that the 1948 civil war stemmed from a multiplicity of causes, neither author spends much time discussing, for example, the effects of the war-induced increase in the daily cost of living or the economic consequences of the social reforms. Neither Aguilar Bulgarelli nor Bell discusses, in any detail, the fiscal and foreign exchange crisis clearly in evidence by the end of Calderon Guardia's presidency. Yet both authors do assume that Calderon Guardia and Picado's reformist policies did alienate key sectors of Costa Rica's dominant class. They simply do not attempt to discover how these phenomena affected different social groups and whether these groups entered the electoral arena or otherwise sought to influence the nature of state policy.
Class and economic perspectives
It is the desire to discern links between economic developments and overt political conflict that inspired Jacobo Schifter's La fase oculta de la guerra civil, and also Lucha social y guerra civil en Costa Rica, 19 4 0-19 4 8 by Manuel Rojas Bolanos. Indeed, both Rojas Bolanos and Schifter essentially argue that less than favourable economic conditions and/or contradictory class forces inevitably led to the outbreak of armed conflict in 1948. In the course of developing this theme these two authors furnish data not previously well known, which they interpret by means of theoretical speculation.
Schifter's principal empirical contribution to the study of class alignments during the 1940S is an ecological analysis of electoral returns during the 1950S and 1960s, which was originally produced by the North American political scientist, Robert Trudeau.16 Schifter's primary goal is 16 See chapter four of La fa sa oculta de la guerra civil (San Jose, 1979 He also makes what I think is a cogent argument, in chapter II, that the closing of the historically very important German market for Costa Rican coffee exports during World War II did not adversely affect either the economy or the interests of coffee growers. As Schifter points out, it was only between 1939 and 1940 that the value of coffee exports declined. While total agricultural exports decreased between 1937 and 194 I, the value of coffee exports increased after 1940, because the US replaced Germany as the principal consumer of Costa Rican coffee. Schifter also contends that it remains unclear how the dominant class reacted to Calderon Guardia's jailing, or to the expulsion of members of Costa Rica's German community to US internment camps.
In his Lucha socialy guerra civil en Costa Rica, Rojas Bolanos contends that the promulgation of social reforms between 1941 and 1943 drove a wedge between Calderon Guardia's (and later Picado's) government and the Costa Rican oligarchyY Alongside alleged capitalist dissatisfaction with the Calderon Guardia government, Rojas Bolanos argues that it also began to feel the effects of former president Cortes Castro's increasingly popular campaign for re-election in 1944. He points out, for example, that the cost of living essentially doubled between 1941 and 1944, most severely affecting the poorest social sectors. IS On the basis of this and related evidence, Rojas Bolanos concludes that 'the peasantry was more inclined to follow Leon Cortes, whom it remembered as the strong man who had piloted an ordered public administration '. The peasantry, because of inflation and the war-induced scarcity of basic consumer goods, ecological analysis does not require the use of individual-level data, the correlations produced by Trudeau only measure the nature of the relationship between the overall social characteristics of , and the aggregate number of votes received by each party in, targeted cantons. The precise nature of class alignments within each canton remains unknown. 17 Rojas Bolanos, Lucha socialy guerra civil en Costa Rica, 1940 -1943 (San Jose, 1979 , p. 12.
Also, see p. 45 for a slightly more extensive affi rmation of the core idea of Rojas Bolanos' study. viewed the Calderon Guardia government with distaste, especially since 'administrative disorder and governmental corruption were so evident, and the benefits of the social reforms were not reaching the masses, above all the impoverished peasantry '.19 Unfortunately, this provocative interpretation is not complemented with an analysis of how urban workers, artisans and others were affected by the increase in the cost of living, or whether and how they mobilised to promote their interests. The shortcomings of Rojas Bolanos' analysis of the political behaviour of the lower classes point to the difficulties associated with the view that class conflict caused the 1948 civil war. Contending that class struggle explains the outbreak of armed hostilities in 1948 requires the analyst to show why and how disputes over the distribution of material resources generated the principal political cleavages of Costa Rican society.
That class struggle was the motor of Costa Rican political history during the 1940S is confirmed according to Rojas Bolanos, by the alleged existence of a rift between Calderon Guardia's government and the Costa Rican oligarchy. According to his view of the social world, states typically protect the interests of the dominant class, thus preserving the capitalist mode of production. 20 That state officials and capitalists disagree, however, might suggest the limitations of such a functionalist theory of the state, rather than establishing the centrality of class conflict in Costa Rica in the 1940s. It is confused thinking to assume that the consequences -in this case, public policies beneficial for the capitalist system -of any set of institutions such as the state can straightforwardly explain its existence. Doing so requires the use of functionalist instead of causal analysis and either denies, or cannot coherently account for, the role played by intentional subjects in human affairs.21
A class-centred interpretation of the 1940S would also have to show that the interests of Costa Rican classes and class fractions were affected in divergent and adverse ways by economic changes and/or state policy. Finally, the class analyst would need to explain how and why these classes 19 Rojas Bolanos, Lucha social y guerra civil en Costa Rica, 1940 Rica, -1943 Merchants also began to criticise government economic policy when the Picado administration could not easily solve the severe foreign exchange crisis produced by the resumption of imports from industrialised countries at the end of World War n.33 However, the collective behaviour of capitalists (or any other class), cannot be inferred solely from an analysis of their class interests.34 It is still necessary to show how and why individual capitalists should have orchestrated a campaign to seek remedy from economic policies harmful to the capitalist class as a whole. Delineating how capitalists, in pursuit of their common class interests, dealt with the possibility of reprisals and the uncertainty regarding the behaviour of their colleagues, allies and opponents is thus an essential component of political analysis.
An examination of the political consequences of the Picado admini stration's income and property taxes reveals that capitalists and middle class professionals reacted in divergent ways to a policy that slightly reduced their individual as well as common incomes.35 In the days after these taxes became law, staunch and long-term opponents of Calderonismo did persuade their middle-class colleagues in an assembly of professionals not only to abstain from paying the new taxes, but also to participate in a general strike.36
The 300 of the estimated 1,500 members of Costa Rica's entrepreneurial associations who attended a hastily organised assembly could only agree to declare their willingness to consider not paying the recently enacted income and property taxes. Capitalists in attendance refused to heed the advice of hardline middle-class professionals, who were also attempting to get a motion approved calling for a tax boycott and a general strike. Chamber of Commerce spoke for many when he argued that no illegal measures should be adopted by the poorly attended assembly. An indication that Zuniga's opinions were widely held was the inability of assembly organisers to obtain the signatures of those present for a petition containing the motion passed. The decision in favour of moderation was confirmed by the Chamber of Commerce in its first general assembly of 1947, when it publicly declared that it would not adopt illegal or violent tactics in its efforts to have the new tax laws repealed.37 Their alleged dislike of Picado's presidential administration did not deter bankers from floating a loan to his government at the end of 1947 nor prevent them from acting as intermediaries in search of a peaceful compromise between the government and opposition in the months preceding the start of the civil war.38 It is clear that the interests of the dominant class were adversely affected as well as favoured by state policy during the 1940S. That an unknown number of capitalists often criticised the government is also undeniable. What remains unproven and indeed improbable is the claim that capitalists organised a collective movement dedicated to overthrowing a regime allegedly inimical to their interests.
Rojas Bolanos, however, remains unwilling to allow such facts to modify his view that the civil war was the product of class conflict. He settles for asserting that the class interests of all social groups found expression in different political parties during the 1940S. For example, Rojas Bolanos claims that Cortes Castro and the PD were supported by 'the large agroexport bourgeoisie -coffee growers and bankers -as well as a large portion of the large import merchants '. Similarly, he suggests that 'medium-sized businessmen and professionals of some renown, of progressive tendencies, began to surround Otilio Ulate '. I assume that Rojas Bolanos believes this group was joined by the sectors supporting Cortes Castro once he died in the aftermath of the 1946 congressional elections. According to Rojas Bolanos, the CEPN and the AD, as well as its successor, the PSD, represented 'a serious alternative to official reformism, started by circles of intellectuals of petty bourgeois extraction, fundamentally, and medium-sized businessmen in coffee or other, different productive branches of this industry '. Finally, in Bolanos' most innovative interpretation, he concludes that Calderonismo 'formed a fraction of the national bourgeoisie, differentiated from the rest of this social class not by the productive branch where it invested its capital ... but by its modernising ideas ' (italics in the original). 39 Aside from artful theoretical embellishments, Rojas Bolanos fails to supply any evidence that supposed class interests found their political expression in the way he outlines. Unfortunately, this is a practice mimicked by other Marxist-influenced historians and sociologists who analyse the 1940s. In Los anos cuarenta, Gerardo Contreras and Jose Manuel Cerdas also conceptualise political parties and other political vehicles as projections of often poorly defined class interests.4o In their respective and widely read books, Jorge Rovira Mas and Jorge Mario Salazar Mora also contend that the behaviour of political actors was determined by class interests.41 While not nearly as explicit (nor as extreme) as Rojas Bolanos, Schifter too adopts such a perspective in La fase oculta de la guerra civil.
While it may be true that political parties did attract supporters from these social classes, it is not clear whether party conflicts represented the clash of clearly identifiable class interests. For example, the CEPN, the AD and the PSD might be petty bourgeois in origins, but this is such a heterogeneous class that elements of it could easily be motivated by non class interests and/or by diverse economic interests or grievances to support a variety of different political parties. The clumsiness of Rojas Bolanos' theoretical premises is best revealed by the inconsistency of asserting that all political parties represented groups possessing con tradictory positions in the mode of production, except Calderonismo. Unfortunately, the anomaly of locating Calderonismo's interests in the realm of ideas is never satisfactorily addressed by Rojas Bolanos.
Ironically, Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell also adopt a variant of this portrait of social and political dynamics. Without succumbing to the worst aspects of a class reductionist perspective, both Aguilar Bulgarelli Until we question the widely held belief that the 1948 civil war was caused by class conflict, troublesome evidence on the subject will continue to cause unnecessary perplexity. Analysts will ignore the fact that dominant class interests were both helped and harmed by state policy during the 1940S. The behaviour of individuals and classes will continue to be inferred inadequately from their often poorly understood class interests. Within this framework political alliances during the 1940S will always remain an unresolved paradox. Most importantly, it will not be possible to explain why the ballot box failed to select a presidential candidate in 1948 acceptable to government and opposition, why numerous attempts to negotiate a peaceful transference of political power ultimately collapsed, and why those who triumphed on the battlefield gained control of the state.
An alternative view oj the 1948 civil war
Attempts to understand the origins of the 1948 civil war might begin by visualising this conflict as a breakdown of electoral institutions. The inability of political actors to accept the results of the 1948 presidential election was a sufficient -though perhaps not also a necessary -condition for the outbreak of armed hostilities in the weeks after this election was held.
Framed in this way, it is important to ask why electoral mechanisms were questioned by political actors in the period preceding these elections and thoroughly discredited by the members of the PRN and the PVP once they were held.45 Interestingly enough, it was members of the governing political coalition who claimed that these electoral results were fraudulent, because thousands of PRN and hundreds of PVP voters were prevented from casting ballots. While fraud directed against the government was unheard of in Costa Rica, the use of fraud and other extra-constitutional devices by all political actors was not.
Until the late nineteenth century, public officials in Costa Rica, as in almost all Latin American countries, were selected in military contests or in fraudulent, often hastily organised elections.46 By the turn of the century, access to state offices in Costa Rica began gradually to be determined by intensely competitive and regularly held (albeit frequently fraudulent) electoral contests that did not exclude the threat and/or use of violence. Indeed, between 1889 and the 1948 civil war (during the period 45 Even a casual examination of newspapers during this period reveals the centrality of electoral issues in Costa Rican politics. A Calderonista view of the electoral fraud purportedly exercised against the government can be found in Jose Albertazzi Avendano, La Tragedia de Costa Rica, pp. 59-7 3' An evaluati on of this claim, along wi th the opposition's allegation of fraud, is contained in my 'The Origins of Democracy in Costa Rica in Comparative Perspective ', PhD di ss., Department of Political Science, Duke University, forthcoming.
46 For analyses of this period, see Cleto Gonzalez Vi quez, EI sufr agio en Costa Rica ante la historia y la legislacion (San Jose, 1975) ; Rafael Obregon Loria, Conflictos militares y politicos en Costa Rica (San Jose, 195 1 ), pp. 1-79 ; and Jorge Saenz Carbonell, EI despertar constitucional en Costa Rica (San Jose, 1985 ) .
I refer to as the Old Republic), at least four coup attempts and eleven revolts were launched against the central government. 47 Not only did elements in the government and opposition employ and/ or threaten to use violence and fraud to improve their position in electoral jousts, but fractions in each political camp came to the conclusion that only the use of violence would allow them to maintain or capture political power. In late August 1 947, for example, certain -reputably Calderonista -elements within the military attempted to assassinate the Minister of Public Security, Rene Picado (President Picado's brother), to provoke an internal coup against a government that was granting too many concessions to the opposition.48 Opposition figures like Jose Figueres were widely believed to favour the use of military resources to topple what they believed to be a government that would never willingly relinquish power to the opposition. 49
Despite the existence of hardliners on both sides, numerous attempts were made by most political parties to effect what was often derisively called a transaccion, that is, the selection of a presidential candidate acceptable to both government and opposition. Cortes Castro attempted to negotiate such a compromise with Picado, especially in the aftermath of both the 1944 and the 1946 elections. In fact, he made it publicly clear on at least one occasion that the use of military force to overthrow Calderonismo was not a viable option and thus justified efforts to make a pact with the government. 50 Throughout 1946, competing March he asked ' eEsta el pais en disposicion de ir a la resistencia armada ? Yo no podria lanzar a los partidarios que con tanta abnegacion me han seguido, a una asonada que seria una carniceria, porque no considero que este el pueblo armado en forma que su rebeldia tuviera vislumbres de buen exito ... Por eso he puesto oidos sordos a las insinuaciones de violencia, que solo podrian merecer el apoyo de los Costarricenses opposition tried to negotiate a transaccion with the government that both the PD and PRN were pursuing but each denied was occurring. In the months before the 1948 elections rumours abounded that different members of the government and opposition were conducting negotiations to avoid the armed confrontation that many feared might occur. From the day that elections were held, numerous attempts were made to mediate the conflict between members of the PRN and the opposition. Within a week of election day, a group of prominent Costa Ricans published an open letter asking Monseiior Sanabria to help them organise an effort to serve as mediators of the emerging political crisis. 51 Members of the TNE also attempted to effect a compromise, as they came to realise that they would be unable to examine all electoral materials by the constitutionally required 25 March deadline. Three days later, when the TNE, with two members in favour and one abstaining, provisionally declared the election of Ulate Blanco to the presidency, efforts intensified to devise a pact between Calderonistas and the opposition. After the 1 March session of Congress that annulled the presidential election results, both Monseiior Sanabria and the Association of Bankers worked around the clock to reach a compromise. 52 But while various formulae were being discussed, word reached San Jose on 12 March that Jose Figueres had attacked government troops sent to discover whether rumours were true that an army was being assembled on his jinca.
This brief survey of numerous attempts to reach a compromise makes the point that a peaceful resolution of the conflicts between the government and opposition was possible. Disagreements on the terms of the compromise of the conflict should not obscure the fact that key political actors were willing to sacrifice other goals for the cause of peaceful cooperation. Indeed, by late March, both Calderon Guardia and Ulate Blanco decided that the new Congress, in its first session on 1 May 1948, should select Dr Julio Cesar Ovares as first designate to the sensatos, cuando llevaran aparejada la preparacion adecuada, para que la protesta armada tuviera alguna probabilidad de buen exito y no significara simplemente un derramamiento infructuoso de sangre Costarricense. ' Cortes Castro then suggested that a compromise presidential candidate be fo und for the 1948 elections. ' The four books I have examined do not discuss these events in any real detail, thus implying that the course taken by events was inevitable. Schifter, for example, in the ten pages of chaper III in La Ja se oculta de la guerra civil dedicated to exploring the period between 1946 and 1948, does not even mention any of these efforts to reach a political compromise. Bell does mention some of these efforts in chapters five and six of his book. However, he concludes a bit too hastily that ' the actions of 1 March closed the way to any alternative other than insurrection '. 53 Such a conclusion can only be justified if Bell can show that both the government and opposition were unwilling to devise a pact to prevent the outbreak of armed hostilities feared by many. Yet he only hurriedly discusses this period, barely referring to Monsenor Sanabria's efforts and offering no analysis of those made by the Association of Bankers to effect a transaccion. Dr Ovares' transitional candidacy, in fact, is only mentioned in a footnote by Bell.54 Similarly Rojas Bolanos only devotes a small number of pages to the analysis of government-opposition relations between 1 946 and 1 948.55 He also pays little attention to efforts to arrange a compromise between the Calderonistas and the opposition. Even Aguilar Bulgarelli chooses to examine only some of these endeavours, despite spending quite a few pages discussing this period. 56 For example, he only dedicates one page to Monsenor Sanabria's efforts in the wake of the nullification of the elections by Congress. Neither does Aguilar Bulgarelli make any mention of the Association of Bankers' participation in these and other attempts to reach a peaceful compromise.
The selective coverage of political events apparent in these narratives is well illustrated by Aguilar Bulgarelli's extensive treatment of Calderon Guardia's motives for presenting the Constitutional Congress with a petition requesting that the 1948 presidential elections be annulled. He contends that if Calderon Guardia had really thought the elections were fraudulent, he should have asked Congress to nullify not only the presidential, but also the congressional elections of 1948. Unfortunately, The tendency not to explore key events and issues in the detail they deserve, along with a set of assumptions privileging the social and/or economic roots of political conflict, have led to the conclusion that the 1948 civil war was inevitable. In combination, these two practices have stifled academic and critical inquiry about the civil war. They also perhaps unintentionally -serve to reinforce those interpretations of the civil war explicitly designed to glorify the role played by Figueres in the events of these years. This indeed is a paradoxical result, for Schifter's book is rather anti-Figuerista in tone, Aguilar Bulgarelli's book is often accused of being Calderonista in inspiration, and Rojas Bolanos' volume, at the very least, is not meant to praise the role played by Figueres during the 1940s. Thus, standard explanations of the origins of the 1948 civil war will remain flawed unless relations between class interests, economic change and political action are specified. Political narratives like those of Aguilar Bulgarelli and Bell do not stand up to scrutiny because they rest upon a questionable understanding of economic and class dynamics as well as a selective analysis of political phenomena. Economic and class perspectives fail to explain why the political conflicts of the 1940S had to be settled through the force of arms because they employ a set of assumptions that conceive of the political arena as a mere projection of 'real ' and inadequately studied conflicts occurring among the material foundations of society. Both approaches lead to the theoretically dubious and empirically unsubstantiated conclusion that the outbreak of violence was inevitable during 1948 in Costa Rica.
Contesting the belief that the 1948 civil war was inevitable generates counterfactual speculation, an approach that is deemed less than useful by many. 58 However, the counterfactuals implied by my reinterpretation of the 1940S focus on opportunities missed to negotiate a peaceful compromise to existing political conflicts. They do not serve as inspiration for the construction of hypothetical worlds of what would have happened if certain decisions had not been taken or if alternative choices had been made. Understanding why political actors did not select one or more possible courses of action contributes to explaining why they made the decisions that they actually did. Reconstructing the calculations made by political actors to assess the efficacy of alternative courses of action is perhaps the best way to comprehend how the behaviour of each political actor was constrained by the behaviour of all.
Emphasising the role of political choice in preventing regime breakdown is, in fact, a central feature of important recent work on the collapse and reconstruction of democratic practices. 59 This approach contends that underlying class conflicts and/or severe economic crises do not compel political actors to undermine democratic practices. This article suggests that analysts of political change need to discern whether institutional arrangements encourage or discourage cooperation, and to explore the opportunities missed or ignored by political actors to resolve their conflicts peacefully.
The 1948 civil war occurred because political parties as well as members and institutions of the state could not reach mutually beneficial compromises regarding the most appropriate way to capture or retain state power. Such inability to mediate differences about political succession within existing institutional arrangements was by no means unusual in 58 Victor Hugo Acuna warned me of the dangers of counterfactual reasoning. I hope that this paragraph explains that I am not advocating, on this occasion, the development of a' new political hist. ory ' like the ' new economic history ' (though I might in the fu ture Costa Rica. It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that Costa Rican political actors began to rely on the ballot box to select the occupants of public office. Even when many agreed to compete for state power in the electoral arena, those in control of the executive often used fraud to modify electoral results. Violence was frequently threatened, less often used, but never disavowed as a legitimate political resource by hard line elements in the government, and especially by those in the opposition possessing the loyalty of few voters. Concentrating on the behaviour of electoral organisations and state officials to explain the outbreak of armed conflict in 1948 does not imply that the behaviour of capitalists is of no political consequence. Indeed, understanding the role of the electoral arena in Costa Rican politics since the end of the nineteenth century requires discerning how public officials pursued policies that placated the interests of coffee exporters, import merchants and bankers. Several decades before the 1948 civil war, for example, Costa Rican capitalists expressed their dislike of the financial and economic policies of President Alfredo Gonzalez Flores (1914-17) by supporting a coup organised by ambitious military officers and opposition political parties.60
What my re-examination of Costa Rican politics during the 1940S suggests is that the dominant class appears to have been reluctant to support coup attempts against the central government. The unwillingess of most capitalists to echo the calls of those in the opposition committed to overthrowing, by whatever means necessary, the governments of Calderon Guardia and Picado is understandable, because these govern ments often pursued policies favouring as well as harming their interests. It is also clear that many capitalists reasoned that armed resistance was not the most useful way to alter public policies they may have found distasteful.
Focusing on the decisions made by political actors also helps to make the paradoxes about the patterns of alliance formation more apparent than real. That the PVP worked with a 'modernising fraction of the national bourgeoisie ', and that the 'middle sectors ' were in the opposition with 'the most conservative sector of national politics ', is only counter intuitive from a perspective that mechanistically links poorly defined class interests to political organisations. All political parties devised strategies to capture state power precisely because different elements in the 60 The standard secondary sources on the overthrow of this president are : Carlos LUIS Fallas Monge, Alfredo Gonzalez Flores (San Jose, 1976) ; Eduardo Oconitrillo Garda, Alfredo Gonzalez Flores : estadista incomprendido (San Jose, 1980); Armando Rodriguez, Admi"istracion Gonzalez Flores (San Jose, 1978) ; and Bernardo Villalobos Vega, Alfredo Gonzalez Flores : polificas de seguros y de banca, I9IO-I9I7 (San Jose, 1981) .
government and opposition had interests that diverged as well as converged. They formed unexpected coalitions with each other because of the choices already made (or in the making) by other political parties. It was the rules in existence regulating access to state office, along with the distribution of political preferences among key groups, that produced the -at first sight -rather strange set of alliances that occurred during the 1940S in Costa Rica.
